Hackers Compromised 14,500+ Dahua Devices Using Credential Attacks, Auth Bypasses, and P2P

Cybersecurity researchers at Hunt.io have disclosed details of a campaign that they say compromised more than 14,530 Dahua devices between June 17 and July 22, 2026, using credential attacks, two authentication-bypass flaws, and a peer-to-peer (P2P) relay technique. The activity, codenamed Operation CameraSwarm , was reconstructed from a 407 MB exposed working directory containing 2,616 files across 234 subdirectories, including tooling, logs, shell history, and campaign records, with the researchers saying confirmed compromises were concentrated in Ukraine and Russia. The researchers said 1,923 cameras were configured with a persistent account during the operation and 283 were reached through the P2P path. Users of affected Dahua products are advised to install the corresponding fix software or newer firmware, while ITRES Labs recommends disabling P2P where it is not required and checking firmware against the vendor's download site. "The relay establishes the route without prior authentication, leaving login checks to the device's web application,"  ITRES Labs  said in an analysis published in October 2025. Hunt.io attributed the 14,530-plus total to three attack paths - Credential attacks:  12,324 unique IP addresses across 13,229 campaign records. Authentication bypass:  1,923 cameras reached using CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, which Hunt.io said were also configured with the persistent account. P2P relay:  283 cameras identified by serial number, including devices located behind network address translation (NAT). The two 2021 flaws are authentication-bypass vulnerabilities in Dahua cameras and related products.  Dahua's advisory  rates them 8.1 on the CVSS scoring system and lists fixed firmware, while the U.S. National Vulnerability Database ( NVD ) currently assigns each a CVSS score of 9.8. "Attackers can bypass device identity authentication by constructing malicious data packets," Dahua said in its advisory. A NetKeyboard client type triggers CVE-2021-33044 during authentication, while CVE-2021-33045 involves a loopback login request using the 127.0.0.1 address, according to the  original disclosure  from security researcher Bashis. As of August 19, 2026, both flaws remain listed in the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities ( KEV ) catalog, which records them as Dahua IP camera authentication-bypass vulnerabilities and advises applying vendor mitigations or discontinuing use if mitigations are unavailable. As of August 19, 2026, the public  p2pwn repository  remains accessible and independently confirms that the tool accepts Dahua serial numbers as input, checks CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, and contains a default dummy-account configuration. The repository does not establish Hunt.io's count of 1,923 affected cameras or its claim that the account survives a factory reset on most firmware. The P2P path is separate from the two authentication-bypass flaws. ITRES Labs found during an earlier incident response investigation that, on firmware before mid-2024, a valid Dahua serial number could be used to establish an Easy4IP relay path before the connected device performed its own credential check, allowing a device behind NAT to become reachable through the vendor's relay infrastructure. The  dh-p2p proof-of-concept repository  also shows that the Dahua P2P protocol locates a device through Easy4IPCloud using its serial number and can establish a tunnel to the camera or network video recorder. A successful P2P relay can make the device reachable behind NAT, but device-level authentication can still be required for access. Hunt.io said the operator's recovered code recorded 89.4% of live serial numbers returning an open channel without authentication. That figure remains a campaign-specific claim from the recovered operator material. It has not been independently reproduced by ITRES Labs, Dahua, or a public computer emergency response team advisory located as of August 19, 2026. Two CVE labels associated with the recovered tooling do not describe the P2P behavior:  CVE-2024-39943  is assigned by NVD to an operating-system command-injection flaw in Rejetto HFS, while Dahua describes CVE-2025-31702 as a privilege-escalation flaw that requires previously obtained normal-user credentials. ITRES Labs described the serial-number relay exposure as a non-CVE issue and said its testing found that the P2P path was reinforced in firmware released after mid-2024. The firm advised defenders to disable P2P unless required, restrict Easy4IP connectivity where appropriate, update devices using firmware from the vendor's website, use strong unique credentials, remove unused accounts, and segment video surveillance systems. Dahua's advisory directs customers to install the listed repair software or newer firmware. The Hacker News has reached out to Dahua to confirm the campaign scope and P2P findings and will update this story with any response. The researchers described the operator as Russian-speaking based on language artifacts recovered from the working directory, but the activity has not been attributed to a named threat actor, a Russian government entity, or another known group. The firm assessed with moderate confidence that parts of the toolkit may have been designed to transfer camera access to a third party. As of August 19, 2026, the campaign-specific totals of more than 14,530 devices, 1,923 persistent accounts, 283 P2P compromises, and the 89.4% open-channel figure remain attributed to Hunt.io. The public primary sources reviewed for this story corroborate the two old authentication bypasses, the p2pwn tool configuration, and the underlying serial-number P2P mechanism, but do not independently confirm those CameraSwarm counts. Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.