ClickFix 2.0: 5,400+ Hacked Sites Use Blockchain Smart Contracts to Deliver Malware
How the EtherHiding technique turned the BNB Smart Chain into an unstoppable malware delivery platform — from fake CAPTCHAs to WebRTC data channels, with a full IOC appendix.
The ClickFix social engineering technique has evolved from a niche phishing tactic into the dominant malware delivery vector of 2026. What started as fake CAPTCHA prompts on a handful of compromised WordPress sites has ballooned into a massive criminal operation leveraging over 5,400 hacked websites — most running WordPress and PrestaShop — to deliver payloads stored directly in smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain (BSC) Testnet.
This decentralized approach — known as EtherHiding — makes the campaign uniquely resilient. Since the malicious code lives on a blockchain, attackers can update payloads at any time without touching the compromised websites, and takedown efforts cannot remove the smart contracts from an immutable ledger. As researchers at Netskope documented, the campaign now operates 300+ infected sites per day, with an August peak of 536 sites hitting the BSC Testnet RPC endpoints daily.
This deep dive covers the full attack chain, the evolution from Polygon to BSC, the newer WebRTC data-channel stager variant, all known payload families delivered through this infrastructure, and a comprehensive Indicators of Compromise (IOC) appendix for defenders.
What is ClickFix?
ClickFix (also called FakeCaptcha or ClearFake) is a social engineering technique that tricks website visitors into executing malicious code on their own machine. The attacker compromises a legitimate website and injects JavaScript that displays a fake CAPTCHA, browser update prompt, or error page. The visitor is instructed to:
- Open the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) or macOS Terminal
- Paste a command that was secretly copied to their clipboard
- Press Enter to "verify they are human" or "fix a browser error"
The pasted command downloads and executes the actual malware payload. Because the victim runs the command themselves, traditional security tools that monitor for suspicious process creation or download patterns can be bypassed — the execution originates from a trusted process (PowerShell, Terminal, or Run dialog) initiated by a legitimate user action.
Users are conditioned to complete CAPTCHA challenges dozens of times per day. The fake dialog is visually indistinguishable from a legitimate Cloudflare Turnstile or Google reCAPTCHA prompt. By the time the user realizes their machine is compromised, the payload is already resident.
The EtherHiding Technique
EtherHiding is a technique discovered by Malwarebytes researcher Jérôme Segura in 2024, in which threat actors store malicious JavaScript code or configuration data inside blockchain smart contracts. Instead of hosting the second-stage payload on a traditional web server — which can be taken down by hosting providers, registrars, or law enforcement — attackers write the payload into a smart contract deployed on a public blockchain.
The compromised website's injected JavaScript calls the blockchain's RPC endpoint to read the contract's storage, extracts the payload, and executes it in the victim's browser. This approach provides several advantages to attackers:
- Immutable infrastructure: Once deployed, the smart contract cannot be removed from the blockchain. Even if all 5,400+ compromised websites are cleaned, the smart contract payloads remain accessible.
- Dynamic payloads: The attacker can update the smart contract's storage at any time, swapping payloads without modifying the injected script on the compromised websites.
- Free RPC endpoints: The BSC Testnet, designed for developers, is available free of charge — zero operational cost for the attackers.
- Evasion: Blockchain RPC traffic looks different from traditional HTTP C2 calls, making detection harder for network security tools.
Earlier iterations of this campaign (tracked by Dark Reading in September 1 coverage of 31 compromised organizations) used the Polygon blockchain for EtherHiding. The shift to BSC Testnet may reflect Polygon's growing scrutiny or simply the operator's preference for BSC's developer-friendly testnet endpoints.
Campaign Timeline
The ClickFix blockchain campaign has evolved significantly over the past months. Here is the timeline of key milestones:
Technical Breakdown: The Infection Chain
Here is a step-by-step breakdown of the infection chain as observed by Netskope and corroborated across multiple security vendors:
| Step | Phase | Action | Technical Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Site Compromise | Attacker compromises WordPress/PrestaShop site | Method unknown (likely plugin vulns, brute-forced admin creds). 5,400+ sites affected. |
| 2 | Injection | Malicious JS injected as Base64 blob | The compromised site has a Base64-encoded JavaScript blob injected into its HTML. When decoded, this JS fetches the next-stage payload from a BSC smart contract. |
| 3 | Blockchain Fetch | Browser calls BSC Testnet RPC endpoint | The injected JS calls the BSC Testnet RPC to read the smart contract's storage. The contract contains the malicious JavaScript configuration/data (EtherHiding technique). |
| 4 | Social Engineering | Fake CAPTCHA displayed to visitor | A realistic Cloudflare-style "Verify you are human" overlay is rendered. The visitor clicks "I'm not a robot." |
| 5 | Clipboard Hijack | Malicious PowerShell command copied to clipboard | The JavaScript copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard. The visitor is instructed to press Win+R, paste, and press Enter. |
| 6 | Payload Execution | PowerShell downloads and executes malware | The pasted PowerShell command downloads the final payload (infostealer, RAT, cryptominer, etc.) and executes it. |
| 7 | Persistence | Post-execution cleanup and persistence | Some payloads (like REVSTEALER modules) disable Windows Update and Defender, then deploy cryptominers or establish persistence via scheduled tasks. |
The WebRTC Variant
Later in the campaign, Netskope observed that the threat actor replaced the ClickFix payload in the smart contract with a WebRTC data-channel stager. This represents a significant evolution in sophistication:
Instead of pasting a PowerShell command, the WebRTC variant establishes a peer-to-peer data channel directly from the victim's browser to the attacker's C2 server. The browser receives JavaScript code through this channel, assembles it in memory, and executes it dynamically — without ever writing anything to disk.
The WebRTC stager works as follows:
- Peer connection created: The injected JavaScript creates an RTCPeerConnection and a data channel, then generates a session description offer — just like a legitimate WebRTC handshake.
- Synthetic answer: Instead of sending the offer to a signaling server and waiting for a reply, the script hand-writes the answer itself and feeds it back into the connection. No real handshake occurs, but a data channel to the attacker's C2 is opened.
- Code delivery: The attacker's C2 server sends JavaScript code through the data channel, which is buffered in the browser.
- Execution: After the channel closes or 10 seconds elapse, the received code is assembled in the browser's memory and executed dynamically by adding it to the DOM head — never saved to disk.
This technique is particularly dangerous because:
- No file written to disk — traditional file-scanning AV cannot detect it
- WebRTC traffic over UDP looks like normal video/chat traffic to network monitors
- No traditional C2 HTTP beaconing — the data channel is ephemeral
Payload Families Delivered
This campaign infrastructure has been observed delivering a wide range of payloads. ClickFix is primarily a loader-as-a-service ecosystem, meaning different threat actors rent or license the delivery infrastructure for their own payloads. The following payload families have been documented across the ClickFix blockchain campaigns:
| Payload | Type | Platform | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amatera Stealer (ACR Stealer) | Infostealer | Windows | THN (Aug 24) |
| WordlistLoader | Dropper | Windows | THN (Aug 24) |
| SynkLoader | Credential stealer | Windows | THN (Aug 24) |
| CountLoader | Dropper/Loader | Windows, macOS | DOUBLECUP/SOCRadar |
| DeviceManager RAT | RAT | Windows | DOUBLECUP/SOCRadar |
| modeloRAT | RAT | Windows | KongTuke/Trend Micro |
| MacSync | Infostealer | macOS | Microsoft (Aug 5) |
| Atomic Stealer (AMOS) | Infostealer + Crypto drainer | macOS | Microsoft, THN, BC |
| Go-based macOS cryptostealer | Infostealer + Wallet drainer | macOS | Huntress/THN (Aug 7) |
| REVSTEALER modules | Persistence + Cryptominer | Windows | Elastic (Sep 2) |
| Deno-based Python stealer | Infostealer | Windows/macOS | Sophos (Aug 11) |
| TerminalFix backdoor | Reverse tunnel + PNG stego | Windows | Microsoft (Aug 28) |
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The following IOCs have been collected from public research by Netskope, BleepingComputer, Dark Reading, SOCRadar, THN, Microsoft, Trend Micro, and other sources covering this campaign cluster. All IPs and domains are defanged with [.] notation.
Compromised Websites (Sample)
These domains were observed serving ClickFix injections. The full list exceeds 5,400 — these are a representative sample from open-source reporting:
| Indicator | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|
| abogadosrosarinos[.]com | Compromised site | THN |
| aptisweb[.]com | Compromised site | THN |
| avene-hebergement[.]com | Compromised site | THN |
| https-xhamster[.]com | Compromised site | THN |
| www[.]caesarjaco[.]co[.]id | Compromised site | THN |
| skybap[.]shop | Compromised site | THN |
| city-forum[.]com | Attacker domain | Reco |
Attacker Infrastructure (IPs & Domains)
| Indicator | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 158[.]220[.]87[.]79 | C2 / Attacker IP (City-Forum) | Reco |
| 213[.]139[.]77[.]109:9090 | Open directory (DOUBLECUP) | SOCRadar |
Blockchain Infrastructure
| Indicator | Description | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| BSC Testnet RPC Endpoints | BNB Smart Chain Testnet RPC pool | Block entire pool — see Netskope advisory |
| Polygon Mainnet RPC Endpoints | Polygon blockchain (earlier variant) | Used in 31-org campaign |
Malware Hashes & Signatures
Note: Specific SHA256 hashes for the ClickFix BSC campaign were not publicly released by Netskope at time of writing. Defenders should monitor for the following behavioral signatures:
- Base64-encoded JavaScript blobs injected into the HTML of compromised WordPress/PrestaShop sites
- BSC Testnet RPC calls from browsers visiting legitimate business websites (unusual traffic)
- WebRTC data channel creation without a signaling server handshake (synthetic answer)
- PowerShell commands containing clipboard-triggered download patterns (
Invoke-Expression,Invoke-WebRequest)
Attack Pattern Signatures
| Pattern | Description |
|---|---|
| Fake Cloudflare Turnstile overlay | "Verify you are human" with "I'm not a robot" checkbox — on any site that does not normally have Cloudflare |
| Win+R or macOS Terminal paste instruction | Any website telling you to paste into Run dialog or Terminal |
| BSC Testnet RPC call in browser devtools | Network tab showing requests to https://data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.binance.org:8545/ or similar testnet endpoints |
| WebRTC without signaling | RTCPeerConnection where the answer SDP is generated client-side (no server handshake) |
Detection & Mitigation
For Network Defenders
- Block BSC Testnet RPC endpoints — Netskope recommends blocking the entire pool of BSC Testnet RPC endpoints. This breaks the EtherHiding delivery chain.
- Monitor for non-web UDP traffic associated with WebRTC — especially on networks where WebRTC is not expected (corporate internal networks, legacy apps).
- Deploy content filtering to detect Base64-encoded JS blobs in HTTP responses from known websites (unusually large inline script blocks on pages that normally have none).
- Block known malicious domains from the IOC list above at the proxy or DNS level.
For Endpoint Defenders
- Monitor clipboard access events from browser processes — unusual clipboard writes triggered by JavaScript should be flagged.
- Restrict PowerShell execution via AppLocker or WDAC for non-admin users.
- Enable AMSI for PowerShell and VBScript to detect the clipboard-paste attack pattern.
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for defender-tampering (Windows Update/Defender disable attempts, as seen in REVSTEALER).
For Website Operators
- Audit WordPress/PrestaShop installations — these platforms represent the overwhelming majority of compromised sites. Update all plugins, themes, and core software.
- Search for injected Base64 blobs in your HTML — look for unusually large inline <script> blocks or hidden iframes.
- Review file integrity — unexpected changes to theme files (header.php, footer.php, index.php) are a common compromise vector.
For End Users
- Never paste commands into Run or Terminal from a website, CAPTCHA, chat message, or popup — no legitimate service requires this.
- Check the URL — ClickFix often triggers on legitimate compromised small-business sites that you trust. Trust the behavior, not the site.
- Manually type known URLs if you see an unusual CAPTCHA on a site you visit regularly.
The single most effective mitigation against ClickFix is user education combined with endpoint policy: if no legitimate workflow requires pasting commands into Run/Terminal from a webpage, then blocking that specific behavioral sequence (clipboard read from browser → paste into PowerShell) catches most ClickFix variants regardless of their blockchain or payload.
Conclusion
The ClickFix blockchain campaign represents a fundamental shift in how malware delivery infrastructure operates. By combining social engineering (fake CAPTCHA) with decentralized infrastructure (smart contracts) and stealth delivery (WebRTC data channels), the threat actors behind this operation have created one of the most resilient malware distribution networks ever observed.
With 5,400+ compromised websites, 300+ active per day, and a growing arsenal of payload families ranging from simple infostealers to sophisticated RATs and cryptominers, this campaign will likely continue to expand. The shift to WebRTC stagers suggests that the operators are investing in evasion — and the next iteration may be even harder to detect.
Organizations should implement the mitigations outlined above, monitor Netskope and other security vendors for updated IOCs, and most importantly — train users to recognize and refuse the "paste this command" social engineering technique that is the foundation of every ClickFix attack.